Abstract. Zero-knowledge arguments" is a fundamental cryptographic primitive which allows one polynomial-time player to convince another polynomial-time player of the validity of an NP statement, without revealing any additional information in the information-theoretic sense. Despite their practical and theoretical importance, it was only known how to implement zero-knowledge arguments based on speci c algebraic assumptions; basing them on a general complexity assumption was open since their introduction in 1986 BCC, BC, CH . In this paper, wenally show a general construction, which can be based on any one-way permutation.
Introduction
Reducing complexity assumptions for basic cryptographic primitives is a major current research program in cryptography. Characterizing the necessary and su cient complexity conditions needed for primitives helps us develop the theoretical foundations of cryptography, and further, reducing requirements for a primitive m a y imply more concrete underlying functions for its practical implementations.
Here we study the problem of secure transfer of the proof of validity o f a n NP assertion" in this perspective. We note that the ability to convey proofs for NP in a secure way i.e., in zero-knowledge ZK fashion, as de ned by GMR has a large variety of applications in cryptography and distributed computing.
Informally, proving some fact in zero-knowledge is a way for one player called prover" to convince another player called veri er" that certain fact is true, while not revealing any additional information. In our setting, we assume that both players are polynomially bounded thus NPproofs where the prover has a witness, are the natural setting. We m ust make complexity assumptions for implementing the above task since in our setting these protocols imply existence of a one-way function. The assumptions could be used in two di erent w a ys:
1. Zero-knowledge proofs GMR, GMW : The prover can not convince the verier to accept a false theorem, even if he gets help from an in nitely powerful computation; while the veri er or anyone overhearing the protocol, if he ever breaks the assumption say, after 100 years, can extract additional information about the proof thus, the security is only ensured computationally. 2. Zero-knowledge arguments CH, BC, BCC : The veri er can not extract additional information even if he is given in nite time i.e., security is perfect; however, the prover assumed to be polynomial-time can cheat in his proof only if he manages to break the assumption on-line during the execution of the protocol. This is the reason to call it an "argument" rather than a "proof".
In many practical settings, ZK-arguments may be preferable to ZK-proofs: the veri er must only be sure that the prover did not break the assumption during their interaction which lasted, say, ten seconds or minutes. Notice that while assuring that the assumption can never be broken is unreasonable, the assumption that something can not be broken during the next ten minutes can be based on the current state of the art. On the other hand, the prover has absolute i.e. information-theoretic guarantee that no additional information is released, even if the veri er spends as much time as it desires trying o -line to extract it. Thus, the notion of zero-knowledge arguments is useful if there is a need to maintain the secrecy for very long time independent of the possible future advance of cryptanalysis.
So far the complexity assumptions needed for perfect-zero-knowledge arguments were too strong | they required speci c algebraic assumptions. This is in contrast with zero-knowledge interactive proofs, which can be based on any oneway function. In this work we nally dispose of speci c algebraic assumptions for zero-knowledge arguments:
Main result: If one-way permutations exist, then it is possible for polynomial-time players to perform a perfect zero-knowledge arguments for all of NP In our proof, we construct an information-theoretically secure bit-commitment scheme, which has additional applications like information-theoretically secure coin-ipping. We can implement the scheme with almost-perfect security based on k-regular one-way functions. One practical implication of our result is that secure arguments can now be based on functions which are DES-like ciphers.
Background and organization
Past successes in establishing basic cryptographic primitives on general assumptions initiated in Y82 have shown that various primitives, which w ere originally based on speci c algebraic functions, can be based on the existence of general one-way functions or permutations. For example, Naor N showed that computationally secure bit commitments i.e., bit commitments which can be broken o -line given su cient resources can be constructed from a pseudorandom generators a notion originated and rst implemented based on a discrete logarithm assumption in BM . The later, in turn after a long sequence of papers can now be based on any one-way function ILL, H . Another primitive that can now be based on any one-way function as well is digital-signature NY, R o . Furthermore these primitives and primitives derived from them, e.g. identi cation were shown to imply a one-way function thus they are equivalent IL . On the other hand, basing the primitive of oblivious transfer on a general one-way permutation which is not a trapdoor 5 was shown to be a seemingly 5 a trapdoor implies that there is an information which enables easy inversion hard task" IR when based on black b o x reductions, it will separate P and NP on the positive side, a trapdoor permutation is su cient.
Concerning secure proofs, Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson showed that zeroknowledge proofs for NPcan be done and require secure encryption functions the results of N, ILL, H give such functions under any one-way function; this applies to general IP proofs as well IY . Further, zero-knowledge proofs and zero-knowledge arguments for non-trivial languages as well as non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of BFM, BDMP imply the existence of one-way functions OW .
In contrast to computational zero-knowledge proofs, the primitive of perfect zero-knowledge arguments for NP was much inferior in this respect: their constructions were known only under speci c algebraic assumptions BCC, BKK, IY, BY, IN . Our result gives the rst general reduction: zero-knowledge NParguments can be constructed given any one-way permutation.
Our construction has two stages. First, we show h o w to design an informationtheoretically secure bit commitment b e t w een two polynomial-time parties based on any one-way permutation we employ a technique that can be called interactivehashing" introduced initially in a di erent model involving an all-powerful party OVY1 . Moreover, we d o i t i n s u c h a w a y that the conversations in the commitment protocol are simulatable i.e. by an expected polynomial time algorithm. Then, we apply the reduction of perfectly-secure simulatable bit commitment" to perfect ZK-argument". A general scheme connecting various commitments to various ZK-systems was given in e.g. IY and can be used.
We note that this work di ers from OVY1 in that there the sender must be able to invert one-way functions, whereas here the sender is e cient this is the traditional cryptographic model. In OVY1 w e deal with oblivious transfer and any technique succeeding in allowing a weak sender there, would be quite signi cant since it would implement oblivious transfer between polynomial time parties using one-way permutations see IR .
Relation to recent w ork on bit-commitment
Recently, models in which parties may h a v e p o w er beyond polynomial-time w ere investigated; it is worth while pointing out the di erences between the current w ork and the recent one. By "From Strong to Weak BC", we denote Bitcommitments BC protocols, in which e v en an in nitely-powerful "Commiter" can not cheat, i.e. change the value of the committed bit except with negligible probability, but the polynomial-time "Receiver" can "see" the commitment, if he breaks the assumption. The result of N imply that under any one-way function, there is a Strong-to-Weak BC from a polynomial-time Commiter to a polynomial-time Receiver that is, it is an e cient protocol and the underlying assumption in this case is optimal IL .
The work in OVY2 i n v estigated commitments between a strong and a polynomial-time players where the strong player actually uses its non-polynomialtime power. Thus, the main issue in that paper is how cryptographic assumptions changes and can be relaxed when the power of players di ers rather than being polynomial-time for both players, as needed in practical applications. It is shown that unless Distributional-NP=RP there is a Strong-to-Weak BC from a Commiter with an NP union co-NP power to a polynomial-time Receiver. Similarly, unless Distributional-PSPACE=RP, there is a Strong-to-Weak BC from a PSPACE Commiter to a polynomial-time Receiver. Distributional-NP is de ned by Levin in the theory of average-case NP, whereas Distributional-PSPACE is a complete in Levin's sense problem for PSPACE under a uniform distribution. Thus, when allowing the commiter to use non-polynomial power this theoretical result relaxes the assumptions in N .
By "from Weak to Strong BC" we denote BC in which e v en an in nitelypowerful "receiver" can not "see" the commitment, but the polynomial-time commiter can not change the value of the commitment if a complexity assumption holds. In OVY2 it is also shown, based on an oblivious transfer protocols among unequal-power players introduced in OVY1 where interactive hashing was presented, that given any one-way function, there is a Weak-to-Strong BC from a polynomial-time Commiter to a PSPACE Receiver and if the receiver is NP, the same holds under a one-way permutation.
The main results in OVY1 yield oblivious transfer under one-way function when players have unequal power. The cryptographic application of OVY1 when both parties are polynomial time, is basing two-party secure computation with one party h a ving information theoretic security under general trapdoor permutation assumption whereas previously known under speci c algebraic trapdoor functions. This is done by applying the results for one-way permutation but by adding a trapdoor property to be useful in cryptographic scenarios so that computations are in polynomial-time.
In the current paper, we assume polynomial-time parties and do not use non-polynomial-time computations. We stress again that this is the model for cryptographic applications. Further, we make no use of trapdoor properties, as BC's and secure interactive proofs do not need decryptions, but rather displaying of pre-images for decommitals. Our result here for BC can be stated as: given any one-way permutation, there is an e cient W eak-to-Strong BC protocol from a polynomial-time Commiter to a polynomial-time Receiver which m a y be stronger; the BC is simulatable and is a commitment of knowledge.
Organization of the paper
In section 2, we give the model, the formal de nitions of the problem, and the assumptions. Speci cally, w e present the model of interactive machines, the de nitions of perfect zero-knowledge arguments, the notion of commitment, and the de nition of one-way functions and permutations. In Section 3, we present the new method for basing a perfectly-secure bit commitment on a one-way permutation, and discuss its reduction to zero-knowledge arguments. In section 4 w e present additional applications of our methods.
Model and De nitions
Let Alice the prover and Bob the veri er be interacting Turing machine GMR, B which share an access to a security parameter n, and a common communication tapes. Each has a private input and output tapes and a private random tape. When Alice and Bob's programs are both polynomial time, we s a y that the protocol is e cient" we will assume this throughout, Alice usually has a private tape in which a witness" to the correctness of the common input is written. We m a y consider Bob to be in nitely-powerful when he wishes to extract information from a protocol conversation, although he needs only poly time computations to execute the protocol. Both parties share an input tape of size k and and two communication tapes": tapes for Alice to write in and Bob to read and vice versa. Bob has a private history tape h.
Perfect Zero-Knowledge Arguments
An NP-proof protocol with polynomial-time prover is a protocol between two polynomial time parties: a prover Alice and a veri er Bob. The parties take turns being active", that is, reading the tapes and performing the computation, outputting a message" on the corresponding communication tape. Both parties are probabilistic machines, i.e., they have a read-only in nite tape of truly random bits which is private and read left-to-right. Alice also has a private input with a witness to the input. Without lose of generality, w e can assume that the input is a legal satis ability SAT statement, since otherwise any N P statement can be translated rst to SAT, and Alice can translate the witness to a witness to the SAT-statement. At the end of the protocol Bob moves to one of two states: ACCEPT or REJECT.
De nition 1 An NP-proof protocol with polynomial-time prover is called a n argument if:
1. There exists a polynomial-time program in the statement size which is a security parameter for Alice such that given any statement in NP, Alice can always convince p olynomial-time Bob that is make Bob move to ACCEPT at the end of the interaction.
2. No polynomial-time Alice interacting with Bob can convince Bob to AC-CEPT, when the input is not true, except with negligible small probability that is for a polynomial p for large enough input the error becomes smaller than 1=pn.
For an input I and history h let CONV Bob I;h be the random variable depending on the parties' random tapes, which Bob produces throughout an interaction with Alice.
We note that similarly an argument can be prove "a possession of knowledge" in the sense that one formally shows that a machine employing the prover can extract a witness to the claimed NP statement FFS, TW, BG . In the next version we describe this as well.
We s a y that two distributions 1 and 2 on f0; 1g n are almost identical if for all polynomials pn , large enough n and for all A f 0 ; 1 g n , j 1 A , 2 A j 1 =pn.
De nition 2 An a r gument is perfectly zero-knowledge if: for all veri er Bob , there is a simulator which is a probabilistic expected p olynomial-time machine M Bob , such that for any input I , it produce s a r andom variable SIM Bob I;h so that the distribution of SIM Bob I;his identical to that of CONV Bob I;h.
Commitment
De nition 3 A bit commitment protocol consists of two stages:
The commit stage: Alice has a bit b on her input tape, to which she wishes to commit to Bob. She Note that the security property does not rely on Bobbeing polynomial time. In addition, if Bob's algorithm can be performed in polynomial-time, we s a y that the bit commitment is e cient" we concentrate on this case.
We s a y that a commitment s c heme is polynomial-time simulatable with respect to the receiver if given a polynomial-time receiver Bob , its history of conversations is a probability space simulatable by h a ving Bob taking part in a computation with an expected polynomial time machine S as in the de nition of zero-knowledge.
We call a commitment a c ommitment of knowledge if there is a polynomialtime machine X extractor interacting with the sender performing the commit stage, such that the probability that X outputs a bit b is close to the probability that the reveal stage outputs same bit b assuming reveal ended successfully. A formal de nition, is postponed to the full version.
In de ning the properties that a bit commitment protocol must obey, w e h a v e assumed a scenario where Bob cannot guess b with probability greater than 1 2 prior to the execution of the commit protocol. In the more general case, Bobhas some auxiliary input that might allow him to guess b with probability q 1 2 . The de nition for this case is that as a result the commit stage the advantage that Bobgains in guessing b is less than 1 pn . All the results of this paper hold for this more general case as well.
One-way functions and permutations
We de ne the underlying cryptographic operations we assume.
Let f be a length preserving function f : f0; 1g ! f 0 ; 1 g computable in polynomial time.
De nition 5 One-way function. f is one-way if for every probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, for all polynomials p and all su ciently large n, P r f x = f A f x j x 2 R f0; 1g n 1=pn:
The above de nition is of a strong one-way function. Its existence is equivalent to the existence of the weaker somewhat one-way function using Yao's ampli cation technique Y82 or the more e cient method of GILVZ which is applicable only to permutations or regular functions. A somewhat one-way function has the same de nition as above, but the hardness of inversion is smaller, i.e. its probability i s i n v erse polynomially a w a y from 1.
If in addition f is 1-1 then we s a y the f is a One-Way P ermutation. F or the construction outlined in Section 3 we require a one-way permutation f. W e note that we can also employ k-regular one-way functions in our protocol, since they can be converted into an "almost a permutation" GKL .
Perfectly-Secure Simulatable Bit Commitment
We present a perfectly-secure scheme and its proof of security. The polynomial commiter generates a bit encryption which comes from two possible distributions. The commiter will be able to open the encryption only as a member of one distribution even though the distribution are identical.
The Scheme based on any one-way permutation
Let f be a strong one-way permutation f on f0; 1g n . Let S denote the sender Alice as de ned in 2.1 and R the receiver Bob as de ned. In the beginning of the protocol, S is given a secret input bit b. Bx; y denotes the dot-product mod 2 of x and y.
Commit Stage.
Commit to a bit b.
1. The sender S selects x 2 R f0; 1g n at random and computes y fx. S keeps both x and y secret from R.
2. The receiver R selects h 1 ; h 2 ; : : : h n , 1 2 f 0 ; 1 g n such that each h i is a random vector over GF 2 of the form 0 i,1 1f0; 1g n,i i.e. i , 1 0's followed by a 1 followed by an arbitrary choice for the last n , i positions. Note that 
end-commit-protocol
It is clear that the protocol described above can be executed in polynomial time by both parties. In the next subsection we will see that it is indeed a perfectly secure bit commitment protocol.
3.2 Proof of security Theorem 1. If f is a one-way permutations exist, then the scheme presented i n Section 3.1 is a perfectly-secure c omputationally-binding bit commitment scheme.
Theorem 1 follows from the two theorems below, the security theorem and the binding theorem, respectively. Theorem 2. For any receiver R 0 , after the commit stage the bit b is hidden information-theoretically.
Proof : We can prove inductively on j, that for any c hoice of h 1 ; h 2 ; : : : h j the conditional distribution of y given h 1 ; h 2 ; : : : h j c 1 ; c 2 ; : : : c j is uniform in the subspace de ned by h 1 ; h 2 ; : : : h j and c 1 ; c 2 ; : : : c j . T h us, at step 4 the probability that y = y 0 is exactly 1 2 . Therefore giving away c yields nothing about b. 2 Theorem3. Assume there exists a probabilistic polynomial time S 0 n that following the commit stage can reveal to a honest receiver two di erent values for b with non-negligible probability over its coin-ips " = "n. Then there exists a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A that inverts f on non-negligible fraction of the y's in f0; 1g n . Proof : Using such a n S 0 w e n o w construct the algorithm A to invert f. A has a xed polynomial time bound and it aborts if its runtime exceeds the bound. By assumption, there exists a set of "n fraction of strings such that if the tape of S 0 is initialized with ! 2 , S 0 succeeds in revealing two di erent v alues for b after the commit stage of n , 1 rounds. We m a y x such a n ! and view S 0 as deterministic. This is true, since one can repeatedly run A with the random tape of S 0 initialized with ! i ; i:= 1; : : : ; m= 1 =" 2 and with probability 1 , e , p m some ! i 2 . W e treat S 0 as a deterministic algorithm from now on.
The responses c i of S 0 to the queries h i sent b y R de ne a rooted tree T whose edges are labeled in f0; 1g. A path from the root to a leaf is de ned by a n assignment t o h 1 ; h 2 ; : : : h n , 1 and it is labeled with c 1 ; c 2 ; : : : c n , 1 . A node U at level i corresponds to a state of S 0 after i,1 stages. It de ned by h 1 ; : : : ; h i , 1 and c 1 ; : : : ; c i , 1 . The outgoing edges of U correspond to R's 2 n,i possible queries.
These edges are labeled with the responses of S 0 . Note that since S 0 may b e c heating, his answers need not be consistent and that on the same query S 0 may give di erent answers depending on the previous queries.
For a leaf u, let fy 0 u; y 1 u gbe the set consistent with S 0 s answers; we s a y u is good if given that R's queries de ne u, then S 0 succeeds in opening the bit committed in two di erent w a ys: i.e. S 0 inverts on both y 0 u and y 1 u.
Description of A: A gets as an input a random image y in f0; 1g n and it attempts to invert y. In order to compute f ,1 y, A tries to nd a good leaf u such that y 2 f y 0 u ; y 1 u g . Starting at the root, A develops node by n o d e a path consistent with y. Fix j to be n , 8log n= + 1. For j rounds A does as follows: for 1 i j at the i round the path so far is de ned by h 1 ; h 2 ; : : : h i , 1 and the labels are c 1 ; c 2 ; : : : c i , 1 such that c i = Bh i ; y . Now, a random h of the 0 i,1 1f0; 1g n,i is chosen note that h is linearly independent from h k ; k i is chosen. If the edge h is labeled with Bh; y, then h i h and the path is expanded by the new node. Otherwise, S 0 is reset to the state before its reply, and a new candidate for h i is chosen. This is repeated until either a success or until there are no more candidates left, in which case A aborts. If A reaches the jth level, it guesses the remaining n,j queries h j ; h j +1 ; : : : h n , 1 and checks whether the path to the leaf is labeled consistently with By;h i . If it is and the leaf reached is good, then A has succeeded in inverting y.
The rest of this proof is devoted for showing that A as de ned above has probability at least " 10 =8e 3 n 8 for inverting y. Note that A as described above does not necessarily halt after a polynomial number of steps. However, as we shall see at the end of the proof, we can limit the total number of unsuccessful attempts at nding a consistent h to 8n without decreasing signi cantly the probaiblity that A succeeds in inverting y.
Before we continue we i n troduce some notation. Since we are dealing with several types of vectors of length n over GF 2 we will distinguish them by calling those vectors that are sent b y R as queries and those vectors which m a y be the image that y attempts to invert as images. Let U b e a n o d e a t t h e i th of the tree de ned by h 1 ; h 2 ; : : : h i , 1 and c 1 ; c 2 ; : : : c i , 1 . W e s a y that y 2 f 0 ; 1 g n is an image in U if Bh k ; y = c k for all 1 k i . W e denote the set of images of U by IU. We know that jIUj = 2 n , i +1 . W e s a y that h 2 f 0 ; 1 g n is a query of U if it is of the form 0 i,1 1f0; 1g n,i .
Let AU; y = jfhjh is a query of U and Bh; y agrees with the label h of
Ugj
An image y is balanced in U i , a node of the ith level if 1 , 1 n AU i ; y 2 n , i , 1 1 + 1 n An image y is fully balanced in U, a n o d e o f t h e j th level, if it is balanced in all the ancestors of U. De ne FU as the set of all y 2 I U and are fully balanced in U. F or a set of queries H a t a n o d e U and an image y of U the discrepancy of y at H is the absolute di erence between jHj=2 and the number of queries in H that agree with y. Finally, recall that j = n , 8logn=" + 1.
Lemma 4. For any node U of level j at least 2 n,j 1 , for = 2 , 3 = 4n,j of the images of U have the property that 2 n,j , 2 7=8n,j AU; y 2 n,j + 2 7=8n,j Proof : First note that any pair of queries h 0 ; h 00 of U has the property that h 00 is linearly independent o f h 0 ; h 1 ; h 2 ; : : : h j , 1 . N o w suppose that an image y of U is chosen at random and consider the indicator a h which is 1 whenever Bh; y is equal to U's response on h. F or any h we h a v e that P r o b a h = 1 = 1 = 2 and for every pair h 0 ; h 00 the events a h 0 and a h 00 are pairwise independent. We are essentially interested in Lemma 5. For any node U of level j and random image y of U the probability that y is fully balanced i n U is at least 1 , for = n2 ,5=8n,j
Proof : Let U 1 ; U 2 ; : : : U j =Ube the nodes on the path to U. F or any 1 i j w e can partition the 2 n,i queries of U i into 2 j,i subsets H 1 ; H 2 ; : : : H 2 j , i of size 2 n,j each such that for any 1 2 j , i and h 0 ; h 00 2 H`we h a v e that h 0 is linearly independent o f h i +1 ; : : : h j ; h 00 . Therefore, similar to Lemma 4, we have that P r o b j P h 2 H , E P h 2 H a h j 2 7 = 8n,j 2 ,3=4n,j . Therefore by Markov's inequality the probability that more than 2 ,1=8n,j fraction of the H`'s have a discrepancy larger than 2 7=8n,j is at most 2 ,5=8n,j . Therefore with probability at least 1 , 2 ,5=8n,j the total discrepancy at node U i is at most 2 ,1=8n,j 2 n,j 2 j,i + 1 , 2 , 1 = 8n,j 2 7=8n,j 2 j,i 2 2 7=8n+1=8j,i 2 and hence with the probability at least 1 , 2 ,5=8n,j we h a v e 1 , 1 n 1 , 2 , 1 = 8n,j+1 AU i ; y 2 n , i , 1 1 + 2 , 1 = 8n,j+1 1 + 1 n The probability that y is balanced in all the levels is therefore at least 1 , n2 ,5=8n,j = 1 .
Lemma 6. The probability that a node U of the jth level is reached by an execution of A is at least 1, e of the probability that it is reached b y a n e x e cution of S 0
Proof : Let U 1 ; U 2 ; : : : U j =Ube the nodes on the path to U's from the root.
For any n o d e U i the probability that U i is reached in S 0 is Q j,1 i=1 The number of nodes at the jth level is Q j,1 i=1 2 n,i and therefore the probability that the image chosen is fully balanced at the jth level is at least 1, 2 e . Call a node good if at least " of the leaves at the subtree rooted at U have the property that S 0 succeeds in cheating, i.e., inverting both images. By assumption, the fraction of good nodes U is at least ". Hence, by Lemma 6 the probability that A reaches a good U at level j is at least 1, e .
Lemma 8. In any good n o de U of level j the fraction of the good l e aves that have at least one image that is in FU is at least "=2. Proof : Any pair of images y 1 6 = y 2 in IU can be together in at most 1=2 n,j of the leaves: in any n o d e U 0 along the way from U to the leaves and for random query h of U 0 we h a v e P r o b B h; y 1 = B h; y 2 = 1=2. Since there are at most 2 n,j+1 images that are not fully balanced in U, then at most Lemma 9. For any good n o de U of level j and z 2 F U , given that U was reached with a fully balanced y, the probability that y = z is at least As can be seen from the proof of Lemma 6 for any z 2 F U w e h a v e that P r o b z is chosen and U is reached 1 e2 n,j+1
Therefore 3 is at least 1 e 2 2 n,j+1
Lemma 10. The probability that A is successful is at least " 10 4e 3 n 8 Proof : Suppose that a A reaches a good node U at level j and the y is fully balanced and b that h j ; h j +1 ; : : : h n , 1 de ne a path to a good leaf that has at least one image in FU. Call this image z. Then by Lemma 9 we know that the probability that y = z is at least 1 e 2 2 n,j . The probability that a occurs is at least " 1, 2 e by Lemma 7 and that b occurs given a is at least "=2 b y Lemma 8. Therefore the probability of success is at least " Note that we h a v e only considered A successes when y was fully balanced at level j. H o w ever, given that y is fully balanced at level j, the probability that A had many unsuccessful candidates until he reached the jth level is small: we know that y is balanced at U i for all 1 i j and therefore AU; y=2 n,i 1=4. Therefore the probability that A had to try more than 8n candidate for the h i 's until reaching level j is exponentially small in n and we h a v e that even if we bound the run time of A by 8 n 2 the probability of success is still at least " 10 =8e 3 n 8 . I f " is non negligible, then this is non negligible as well. This concludes the Proof of Theorem 3.
For our applications we need a simulatable bit commitment and commitment of knowledge to be de ned in the full version along the lines of BG .
Theorem 11. There is a perfectly-secure commitment scheme which is simulatable, and is commitment of knowledge.
Proof sketch: All actions of S are in polynomial time, so simulatability generating the same distribution in polynomial time is given.
To a c hieve simulatable commitment of knowledge, one has to modify the basic protocol described above as follows. The protocol's steps 1,2, and 3 will be rst performed twice. At this point R asks S to open the chosen x which i s t h e pre-image of y of one of the instances and continue the protocol with the other instance. Obviously, the security and binding properties are maintained.
To get a commitment of knowledge, we h a v e an extraction algorithm X which plays the steps 1,2, and 3 twice. Then, it decides on which instance to continue, it asks to open it and gets y, then the simulation is backtracked and the other instance is asked to be opened, and the actual commitment is done using the by n o w known y in step 4 and 5 given the input bit b to the machine X. The probability that the commitment will be di erent is negligible assuming the hardness assumption as was shown above. 2 Next, we can state the following known reduction theorems" present in the works on computational perfect zero-knowledge proofs arguments GMW, BCC, IY .
Theorem 12. If there is a perfectly-secure commitment commitment scheme which is simulatable by an expected probabilistic polynomial-time machine interacting" with the receiver and the receiver is polynomial-time, then there is a perfect zero-knowledge argument computationally zero-knowledge proof for any statement in NP.
The perfectly-secure simulatable bit-commitment protocol can be used in the general scheme above. In addition, the general proof system scheme can also be shown to give a proof of possession of a witness" i.e., proof of knowledge as was formalized FFS, TW, BG . Thus, combining the above, gives our main result:
Theorem 13. If any one-way permutation exists, then there exist perfect zeroknowledge arguments for p roving language-membership as well as for p roving knowledgeof-witness.
Discussion
There are various other applications to information-theoretically secure bit commitment. For example, another application of the bit commitment a b o v e i s a "coin-ipping protocol" introduced by Blum B , with perfect security, and assuming only a one-way permutations.
For practical purposes consider the data encryption standard DES Kon . Given a k-regular GKL one-way function i.e. the number of pre-images of a point i s k and is k on a signi cant fraction, one can transform it into a one-way function which is 1-1 almost everywhere GILVZ . We apply this to the function DESk;m = y k = k ey, m= message where actual used parameters are k 2 f 0 ; 1 g 56 , m; y 2 f 0 ; 1 g 64 . Assuming that DES is not breakable on-line say in 10 seconds, then it is a good candidate for our scheme. We explore this further in the full version of the paper. The security of the commitment is not perfect but rather almost-perfect guessing the commitment is not exactly 1 2, but it is close to 1 2. We note that DES is available in many machines and usually on an optimized hardware circuit.
It is an interesting question whether a general one-way function with no additional property su ces for zero-knowledge arguments. Reducing the rounds by more than the achievable logarithmic factor is interesting as well.
